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1 
 
“Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.”1  
Analyzing Sexual Violence in the Bosnian Genocide and the Response of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
Madeline Brashear  
 
 
Sexual violence in wartime has existed throughout history. However, it was 
treated as a byproduct of war, which denied its severity and culpability. It was not until 
1995 that sexual violence was addressed and prosecuted in an international criminal 
tribunal. At the dawn of the 21st century, women began to receive justice for the crimes 
committed against them in wartime. The rape, forced impregnation, and sexual slavery 
perpetrated against women in the Bosnian genocide initiated the prosecution of sexual 
violence in an international setting. This was because sexual violence was used as a 
weapon of war. The Bosnian war (1992-1995) drew international attention to the issues 
of gender violence, causing the United Nations (UN) to come under substantial pressure 
to condemn and end the violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through the force of 
Western humanitarian organizations and the media, the UN was pressured to respond to 
the atrocities committed against women in the Bosnian genocide.  This response resulted 
in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), which put the prosecution of sexual violence and the maintenance of women’s 
rights on the UN agenda. With Western media and aid organizations exposing and 
																																																								1	“’Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.’ Zlata, 23, recalled one of the officers 
telling the Seselj followers. According to the victims, preparations for the mass rapes 
began as early on the morning of June 17 (1992)…” Roy Gutman, A Witness to 
Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia. 
Pennsylvania State University (1993), 70 
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2 
condemning the gender violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN, through the ICTY, 
focused its authority on addressing this specific violence.  
Historical analysis of the ICTY and sexual violence in the Bosnian genocide has 
heretofore focused on the failures and successes of the ICTY, and has done so using a 
feminist framework. Kelly Askin argued that “the crimes are usually investigated and 
indicted only after concerted pressure by women’s rights organizations and feminist 
scholars to prosecute the crimes.”2 Askin and Heidi Haddad both focused on the 
influence of women’s rights organizations; however, Haddad expands the argument to 
include larger advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch.3 These scholars observed 
the problem through the lens of feminist advocacy. For example, Karen Engle 
concentrated her analysis on the discord among feminists in defining how rape should 
have been prosecuted, claiming “Feminists had both a direct and indirect impact on the 
development of international criminal law, particularly on the ways it addressed rapes 
that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”4 Using this same interpretative lens, this paper 
intends to expand the field of analysis to include the media and various political agencies. 
Previous analysis of the ICTY focused on aspects of the impact of advocacy, however it 
did not look at the larger picture, including political organizations, media, and advocacy 
organizations. Feminist organizations have been recognized for their role in condemning 
sexual violence in Bosnia and their influence on the ICTY. Furthermore, an analysis on 
																																																								
2 Kelly Askin, “Prosecuting Wartime Rape and other Gender-Related Crimes under 
International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,” Berkeley Journal of 
International Law Volume 21 no. 2 (2003). 
3 Heidi Haddad, “Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan Tribunals,” Human Rights Review 12 no. 1 (2011), 120. 
4 Karen Engle, “Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, “ The American Journal of International Law 99 no. 4 (2005). 
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how the ICTY prosecuted sexual violence and its influence on subsequent international 
tribunals is necessary.  
Rape was not addressed in international criminal tribunals previous to the ICTY, 
and therefore no international policy existed on the prosecution of rape and sexual 
violence. Neither the Nuremberg Tribunal nor the Tokyo Tribunal fully addressed the 
innumerable instances of rape, which occurred in World War II.5 The absence of female 
policy makers and enforcers largely explained the lack of jurisdiction on gender violence, 
as rape in wartime was viewed as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the 
conflict. Additionally, rape was deemed as a crime against personal honor. The 1907 
Hague Convention did not mention rape, however, Article 46 states “family honour and 
rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice, must be respected.”6 Further, the 1949 Geneva Convention and 1977 Additional 
Protocols categorized rape as an attack on the woman’s honor. Article 27 of the Geneva 
Convention states, “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their 
honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”7 
In 1979, the UN established the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), though this document made no mention of 
																																																								
5 Richard Goldstone and Estelle Debon, “Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes 
Under International Criminal Law,” New England Journal of Public Policy Vol.19 
(2003), 123. 6	International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 18 October 1907, 
Article 46. 
7 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 287Article 27. 
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rape or sexual violence.8 Sexual violence against women was eventually addressed in the 
1989 CEDAW, General Recommendation 12.9  The establishment of CEDAW reflected 
the developing international women’s rights movement, as by this point feminist 
advocacy had begun to take hold in international policy. Despite the Convention and its 
mission against the discrimination of women, sexual violence was still used as a tactic of 
war in Bosnia, demonstrating that international policy failed to address sexual violence in 
its totality. By treating rape as a crime against honor and a by-product of war, rape was 
allowed to endure on a global scale.  
From 1992 to 1995,during the Bosnian war, genocidal violence took a new form 
through the systematic and mandated rape of Bosnian women. Serbian soldiers targeted 
and attacked Muslim women using both rape and public humiliation. By committing 
these acts, Serbian soldiers intended to force the Muslim Bosnian population from their 
homes.10 This tactic was not used sparingly, but was instead implemented from the top of 
the Serbian command. From a witness testimony, “Almira said one of her captors told her 
they wanted to ‘plant the seeds of Serbs in Bosnia.’”11 Serbian soldiers were encouraged 
to rape and commit violence against Bosnian women as part of a tactic, which was 
identified and coined as “ethnic cleansing.”12 The purpose of this “ethnic cleansing” was 
																																																								
8 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, 
9 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 12: Violence against women, 1989. 
10 EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim women in the Former 
Yugoslavia. “Report on Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European Council, 
(Copenhagen: 1993). 
11  Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of 
“ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia, Pennsylvania State University (1993), 76. 
12 Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s Human 
Rights. New York. (1995), 10. 
5
Brashear: “Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.” Analyzing Sexual
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018
	 																																																																																																																																								Brashear
          
5 
to force the Muslim Bosnian population to flee the country, and the Serbian government 
discovered that rape was an effective method to achieve their end goal. “Mass rapes 
instill terror, so that the victims will never seek to return to their homes and villages.”13 
The proliferation of the term “ethnic cleansing” as a euphemism for genocide is 
important to note, because while the crimes being committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were massive and unacceptable, the delayed reactions by the UN was characteristic of 
this conflict. The term “ethnic cleansing” was coined by Bosnian Serb forces to justify 
their actions of murder, rape, and pillage carried out against the Muslim Bosnian 
population in an attempt to rid the country of this specific group.14 The Commission for 
War Crimes defined “ethnic cleansing” as “a conscious policy of an ethnic or religious 
group that intends through violent and horrific means to remove the civilian population of 
another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”15 The United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) adopted and spread 
this term.16 The UN severely condemned the acts of Serbian nationalists, however it was 
slow to provide any relief for the victims of this violence. Rape was implemented as a 
																																																								
13Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to 
Genocide in Bosnia. New York: NYU Press (1996), 76. 
14 Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human 
Rights, New York (1995), 9.  
15 Security Council Resolution 780 established the Commission for War Crimes on 6 
October 1992. This commission reported on the crimes committed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This definition of “ethnic cleansing” was present in the First Interim Report 
of the Commission for War Crimes; Interim Report of the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). 16	Gregory Kent, “Humanitarian Agencies, Media and the War against Bosnia: 
‘neutrality; and framing moral equalization in a genocidal war of expansion,” The 
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance,” (2003). 
6
Voces Novae, Vol. 9 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol9/iss1/5
	 																																																																																																																																								Brashear
          
6 
tool of “ethnic cleansing,;” its purpose was to force the population to abandon their 
homes.  
Bosnian Serbs were among the first to use rape as a tool of war and genocide in 
the form of state policy.  
This is also rape as a policy of ethnic uniformity and ethnic conquest, of 
annexation and expansion, of acquisition by one nation of other nations. It 
is rape because a Serb wants your apartment. Most distinctively, this is rape 
as ethnic expansion through forced reproduction.17 
 
Forced impregnation was an integral part of Serbia’s policies of genocide in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and this conflict was the first in which it was used as a form of systematic 
and mandated gender violence. “The UN Commission that investigated the rapes in the 
former Yugoslavia in January 1993…found 119 cases of pregnancy resulting from 
rape…in 104 of the 119 cases the women decided to abort the pregnancy.”18 These 
numbers did not represent the actual proportion of women raped and forcibly 
impregnated, as underreporting was an issue. The stigma attached to rape, as well as 
shame and the fear of reprisal prevented women from reporting rape.19 Rape and forced 
impregnation were used in tandem to destroy the female population of Muslim 
Bosnians.20 Forced impregnation was a method of “ethnic cleansing” because of the 
Serbian notion that forcefully impregnating Bosnian women with Serbian babies would 
eradicate the Muslim Bosnian population while expanding the Serbian population. These 																																																								
17 Catherine MacKinnon, “Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights,” 17 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal Vol. 5 (1994), 13. 
18 Alexandra Stiglmayer, Mass rape: the war against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (1996), 135. 
19 United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary General, UN Doc A/48/92 S/25341 (26 
February 1993). 
20 Siobhan Fisher, “Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide” Duke 
Law Journal Volume 46 no. 91 (1996), 92. 
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forced impregnations inflicted severe psychological trauma and bodily harm upon the 
female victims. International law scholar, Siobhan Fisher identified forced impregnation 
as “a military occupation of the womb.”21 Forcefully impregnating and then detaining 
women until the pregnancy was too far enough advanced to terminate was a new and 
separate gendered attack against women. Not only did these women have to live with the 
trauma of being raped, they were forced to carry the child of their attacker.  
Rape was used to attack the victim based solely on their gender. The rape of 
civilian women in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Serbian soldiers was a tool of war in 
addition to an act of genocide, contributing to the focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
humanitarian and political organizations as well as international media. 
More and more journalists spoke with the women and girls concerned, 
made known the horrible details of rapes, and quoted large numbers of 
victims. Since then the subject has been taken up by investigatory 
commissions and human rights organizations, women’s groups, and aid 
agencies, but also by politicians.22 
 
Serbian troops further targeted women and performed acts of sexual violence against 
them through the institution of rape camps in occupied territories. “A leading Bosnian 
Women’s group has charged that upwards of 10,000 Bosnian women are currently being 
held in Serb detention camps where their captors rape them repeatedly.”23Amnesty 
International reported on the institution of rape camps throughout Bosnian territory, 
highlighting the organization and intent of rape within these camps.24 Rape camps were 
the sites in which forced impregnation was instituted. These women were purposely 
																																																								21	Siobhan	Fisher,	Occupation	of	the	Womb:	Forced	Impregnation	as	Genocide,”	124.	
22 Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War against women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 161 
23 Gutman, Witness to Genocide, 69. 
24 Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, AI Index: EUR 
63/01/93 (January 1993), 7. 
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detained to be raped, impregnated, and forced to carry the resulting child to term. 
“Serbian soldiers, as a routine practice, forcibly impregnated non-Serbian women held in 
rape camps, continued to gang-rape these pregnant women for months, and finally 
expelled them from Serbian occupied territories when they were near term.”25  
The site of these crimes, known as Partizan Sports Hall, was in the center of 
Foça, a small predominately Muslim town in Eastern Bosnia. At times, it 
was used as a transit factory for women and children about to be deported 
from the town. But for two months in 1992, between June and August, it 
functioned as a rape camp, holding 74 people, including about 50 
women…Partizan was one of dozens of Serb rape camps in Bosnia-some are 
said to be still in operation-and it was prominently located, next door to the 
police station.26  
 
The use of rape camps by Serbian forces reflected intent of genocide towards Bosnian 
women. The reports by humanitarian organizations and Western media on the use of 
rape, forced impregnation, and rape camps revealed a concern for women’s rights 
through their exposure and condemnation of this gender violence.  
 It is important to note that the crimes of rape, forced impregnation, and sexual 
slavery occurred on both sides of this conflict. Muslim Bosnian forces instituted 
detention centers where they beat, raped, and killed Serbian civilians. Sexual violence 
was not limited to Serbian forces. However, the systematic and mandated sexual abuse of 
women by Serbian forces was committed on a much larger scale. The European 
Community (EC) estimated there had been 20,000 victims of rape by Serbian forces in 
1993.27 While this did not excuse the sexual violence committed by Bosnian forces, the 
scale and nature of the crimes was noteworthy. Furthermore, “most of the abuses 																																																								
25 Cushman and Stjepan, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, 
47. 
26 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide 157. 
27European Community,“ EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim women 
in the Former Yugoslavia: Report to EC Foreign Ministers” February 1993. 
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attributable to the predominately Muslims forces of the Bosnian government are 
perpetuated by individuals and do not appear to be a pre-meditated plan of the Bosnian 
authorities.”28 This differed significantly from the Serbian campaign of “ethnic 
cleansing.” Bosnian Serb forces utilized sexual violence as a tactic of war and 
coordinated “ethnic cleansing” operations to forcibly remove the Muslim population from 
the region.29 Serbian troops ran two-thirds of the reported 407 detention camps in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; these camps were part of and practiced the state policy of “ethnic 
cleansing.”30 While Serbian actions were more systematized and coordinated than other 
documented instances of sexual violence, it remained a crime all too commonly 
perpetrated by all parties to the conflict.  
In response to the conflict and violence that ensued, humanitarian organizations 
embedded themselves within the region to provide aid and sanctuary for the victims and 
refugees of the war. Additional activities by these organizations included investigating 
and reporting on the “ethnic cleansing” and sexual violence. Humanitarian organizations 
were the first to publish reports on the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Their presence within the region made it impossible to avoid the evidence and knowledge 
of “ethnic cleansing,” and awareness of the widespread sexual violence became public 
within the first months of the conflict.31 Political institutions and the media began to pay 
close attention to the conflict in Bosnia, aided by the humanitarian organizations’ 																																																								
28 Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human 
Rights, New York (1995), 9.		29	Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human 
Rights, 9.  
30 Cushman and Mestrovic, This Time we Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in 
Bosnia, 52. 31	Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human 
Rights, AI Index EUR/63/01/92 (1992).	
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documentation and publications of the atrocities committed. These organizations sent 
investigatory missions to document the humanitarian situation and to help decide what 
type of aid was needed. However, what resulted was a media frenzy when evidence of the 
violence against civilians was published.32 The humanitarian organizations affected the 
situation in multiple ways. The organizations provided aid to the victims, but also acted 
in a political manner when releasing information or allowing media organizations to 
participate in their fact finding missions. Ultimately, these organizations became 
witnesses to the crimes committed. By publishing the information, humanitarian 
organizations were able to sway public opinion, which further put pressure on the 
international community.  Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch used their 
presence and prominence to investigate, report, and condemn the sexual violence that was 
occurring in Bosnia. The reports published by these organizations put intense pressure on 
the UN to address and eradicate gender violence in the region.  
 Utilizing documented abuse reports, these organization campaigned governments 
and political bodies to act against these abuses. They also released 20 publications on 
Bosnia from 1993-1994, eight, which mentioned rape, and four that focused exclusively 
on rape.33 In addition, they conducted a fact-finding mission in Bosnia in August of 1992 
that resulted in the publication of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human 
Rights, and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuses by Armed Forces34. The 
former reported on the abuses committed by Serbian forces, utilizing interviews and 																																																								32	Human Rights Watch, The Human Rights Watch Global Report of Women’s Human 
Rights, 9.	
33 Heidi Haddad, “Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan Tribunals,” Human Rights Review 12 no. 1 (2011), 125. 34Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights, 
AI Index: EUR/63/01/92 (1992)	
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testimony from the victims.35 The significant findings included that Serbian soldiers 
illegally detained civilian non-combatants in detention centers, where torture and 
mistreatment was conducted. Furthermore, instances of these detentions occurred where 
no fighting was taking place locally.36 This report revealed that atrocities were being 
committed against civilians, which alarmed the public and brought greater attention to the 
conflict. Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Focus provided greater detail on the human 
rights violations regarding abuses against women. Amnesty International acquired 
testimony through their officers, journalists, and women’s advocacy groups in Bosnia.37 
These records indicated that there was a presence of fact-finders in Bosnia, whose report 
brought massive media attention to the human rights violations. This report publicized 
that soldiers were encouraged by their commander to forcefully detain, humiliate, and 
rape Muslim Bosnian women without any fear of reprimand from their commanding 
officers.38 It alluded to the discriminatory nature of the instances of rape, specifically that 
“in almost all reported or alleged cases the victims are of different nationality from the 
perpetrator, that is women have been singled out for humiliation on account of their 
nationality…”39 This report recommended further investigation into the sexual abuses 
and support for the victims. In Bosnia, Amnesty International was pertinent in bearing 
																																																								35Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights, 
AI Index: EUR/63/01/92 (1992), 22. 
36Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights, 
AI Index: EUR/63/01/92 (1992), 25.	37Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, AI Index: EUR 
63/01/93 (1993), 8. 
38 Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces AI Index: EUR 
63/01/93 (1993) 8. 
39 Amnesty International, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces AI Index EUR 
63/01/93 (1993), 8. 
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witness to the human rights violations that occurred.40 By ensuring international witness 
to the atrocities, further attention was brought to the sexual violence on an international 
scale.  
Human Rights Watch deployed and investigated the violations in Bosnia at the 
start of the conflict in 1992. Witness testimony taken by Human Rights Watch was 
reported in War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II in 1993.41 Witness testimonies 
were additionally published in The Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s 
Human Rights, which included research conducted from 1990 to 1995 regarding 
international abuses of women. The sexual violence in Bosnia was featured through 
interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch from the victims of rape and “ethnic 
cleansing” in Bosnia during the conflict. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported on 
the forcible impregnation, which they cited as a tool of “ethnic cleansing.” “Women 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how they were gang-raped, taunted with 
ethnic slurs, and cursed by rapists who stated their intention forcibly to impregnate 
women as a haunting reminder of the rape and intensification of the trauma it inflicts.”42 
Furthermore, this report reflected on the impact of the media attention on rapes 
committed in Bosnia. Human Rights Watch cited the evolving public perception of rape 
due to international organizations for women that advocated for the punishment and 
condemnation of rape.43 This organization proposed further investigation into forced 
																																																								
40 Kristen Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 
International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 83 no 843 (2001), 785.	41	Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II (New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 1993). 
42 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women’s Human 
Rights, New York (1995), 9.  
43 Ibid., 10.  
13
Brashear: “Don’t Worry. These girls have been raped once.” Analyzing Sexual
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018
	 																																																																																																																																								Brashear
          
13 
impregnation as a form of “ethnic cleansing.”44  In publishing their findings, Human 
Rights Watch increased awareness to this “ethnic cleansing” in the form of media 
attention for the victims as well as further humanitarian aid for the women.   
During the conflict, Human Rights Watch adopted a political stance, failing to 
remain impartial. In a statement released in June of 1994, Human Rights Watch 
denounced the UN and their failure to take direct action against the human rights 
violations, claiming their failure had allowed the “ethnic cleansing” to spread and 
resonate throughout Bosnia.45 Human Rights Watch demanded immediate action from 
the UN to protect the remaining civilians in Bosnia from becoming victims of the “ethnic 
cleansing.” By transmitting evidence of the violence in Bosnia, Human Rights Watch 
assisted in bringing media attention to the genocide, which ensured public awareness of 
the atrocities committed. Likewise, by taking a political stance and demanding action 
from the UN, Human Rights Watch put additional pressure on the UN as an organization.  
Humanitarian organizations were assisted by journalists in investigating the rape, 
enslavement, and forced impregnation of Bosnian women, who “discovered” the 
detention camps and published images from Trnopolje and Omarska in August of 1992.46  
Roy Gutman, a journalist for Newsday, investigated the crimes in Bosnia, using his 
reports to write A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of 
“Ethnic Cleansing” in Bosnia.47 Gutman first reported on the genocide in August, 1992, 
using witness testimony of the women living in refugee centers on the ordered rape of 40 
																																																								
44 Ibid., 10.		45	Human Rights Watch, “War Crimes in Bosnia- Herzegovina: U.N Ceasefire Won’t 
Help Banja Luka,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 6 no. 8 (June 1994).  
46 Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
47 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 140.   
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Muslim women.48 Gutman’s was the first complete report of the rapes of Muslim women 
by Serbian soldiers in August of 199249 accompanying the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) inspectors to several Serb detention facilities.50 His account of the 
Bosnian genocide flooded Western and international media alike, bringing widespread 
attention to the gender violence inflicted there. He also reported on the actions of the UN 
and the ICRC. His reports on humanitarian actions revealed how ineffective the current 
peacekeeping efforts were, “for foreign relief agencies the deployment of the British and 
other forces under UN control is another case of inadequate humanitarian ‘Band-Aids’ 
that have no impact on the war itself.”51 Gutman outlined UN activity in investigating 
and condemning the mass rape and violence in Bosnia. His reports on the violence in 
Bosnia, as well as the limited action taken, exposed to the international community that 
little to nothing had been done to prevent the genocide and sexual violence. “Reports in 
Newsday and other publications, that the conquering Serb forces engaged in systematic 
rape of Muslim and Croat women and minors, prompted a flurry of investigations by 
international committees.”52 International journalists inserted themselves within the 
conflict to record victim and witness testimony. At one point, approximately 5,000 
journalists were reporting on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.53 The mass media 
reports of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina became well known, “in the 18 month period 																																																								
48 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 38. 
49 Stiglmayer, Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25.		
50 Gregory Kent, “Humanitarian agencies, Media and the War against Bosnia: ‘neutrality’ 
and Framing Moral Equalization in a Genocidal War of Expansion,” The Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance  (August 2003). 
51 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 127.  
52 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 146. 
53 Kirsten Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” IRRC Vol. 83 No. 843 (September 2001), add page number or end with 
period 
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between April 1992…and September 1993…139 media stories ran in major world 
publications with ‘rape’ in Bosnia in the headline of their story.”54 In 1993, The Los 
Angeles Times published “Testimony: A Trio of Women’s Voices Bear Witness to the 
Horror of War and Rape as Yugoslavia Disintegrates.”55 This article used witness 
testimony to expose the atrocities that women were facing.  Western media was 
instrumental in the promulgation of information and international attention to the crimes 
of sexual violence, both during and after the Bosnian genocide. Extensive coverage of the 
atrocities committed put pressure on the international community to respond.56  
The distribution of information and first hand accounts of the war and violence in 
Bosnia by journalists was possible due to the media support from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR began operations for 
humanitarian relief efforts in Bosnia in 1992, and was assisted by the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in delivering humanitarian aid. The UNHCR established 
relationships with media agencies, providing opportunities for journalists to report on the 
front lines. Journalists were often issued UNHCR ID cards, which improved their access 
throughout the region and, at times, were smuggled through checkpoints by UNHCR 
officials.57 In locations that journalists could not access, the UNHCR provided them with 
information that exposed the atrocities committed in those areas.58 The UNHCR had a 
direct role in the mass media reports on the situation in Bosnia, intending to bring as 																																																								
54 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 125. 
55 “Testimony: A Trio of Women’s Voices Bears Witness to the Horror of War and Rape 
as Yugoslavia Disintegrates.” Los Angeles Times. January 31 1993.   
56 Kent, “Humanitarian Agencies, Media and the War against Bosnia: ‘neutrality’ and 
framing moral equalization in a Genocidal War of Expansion.” 
57 Mark Cutts, “The Humanitarian operation in Bosnia 1992-95: dilemmas of negotiating 
humanitarian access,” Working Paper No. 8, UNHCR. 
58 Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia,” 803.	
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much attention to the violence in Bosnia. This participation was because of their 
understanding of the importance of international journalists and the media. This tactic 
incited condemnation for the inaction, and led to the condemnation of the UNHCR.  
The reports of humanitarian organizations and media outlets and their demands 
for action compelled political agencies to involve themselves in the conflict. However, 
member nations of the UN wanted little to do with the conflict, which they considered a 
civil war. It was not until the reports of sexual violence and “ethnic cleansing” arose that 
nations made a concerted effort to understand the conflict.  The United States (US) was 
one of the first, and loudest, nations to take an interest in Bosnia. As the most powerful 
member of the UN, the US had a substantial influence on UN policy and action. The US 
conducted intelligence investigations on the “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The US had gathered intelligence on the detention camps in July 1992 prior 
to these camps being exposed by the media.59 In 1993, the CIA documented “Rape as an 
Instrument of Ethnic Cleansing,”60 This document outlined the severity of the genocide in 
Bosnia at the time and uncovered 34 facilities where women were held and raped.61 The 
Clinton administration was deeply concerned with the genocidal violence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and because of the findings in the intelligence reports, President Bill 
Clinton deployed a rhetoric denouncing the genocidal acts and pushed for action based on 
																																																								59	Vaughn Shannon, “Judge and executioner: the politics of responding to ethnic 
cleansing in the Balkans,” Journal of Genocidal Research 7 no.1 (2005), 55. 
60 CIA Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum. “Rape as an Instrument of Ethnic 
Cleansing.” 2 April 1993. Released October 2013 by CIA Historical Collections 
Division.  
61 “1993-04-02, Office of European Analysis Report re Rape as an Instrument of Ethnic 
cleansing,” Clinton Digital Library. 
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America’s moral obligation.62 The US actively pressured the UN to aggressively pursue 
an end to the violence, supporting the use of force in the conflict as well as the 
establishment of the ICTY. However, the US was the only Security Council member who 
campaigned for the use of military force in the form of airstrikes.63 The US campaigned 
for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted airstrikes near the end of the 
conflict, as Clinton feared that the credibility of NATO, and subsequently of the US, was 
weakened by the failure to successfully intervene.64 
American politicians such as Senator Bob Dole also demanded action, stating “it 
was about whether some small country that had been ravaged on all sides, pillaged, 
women raped and children killed—do they have any rights in this world?”65Key members 
of the Clinton Administration such as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and US 
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright called for military action based solely on the 
humanitarian crisis. Advisor Lake issued a statement to President Clinton in 1993 
advising the use of humanitarian airdrops to the Bosnian civilians.66 From the start, UN 
Ambassador Madeleine Albright made her desire for immediate military action evident. 
Albright insisted that military intervention was a necessity to provide humanitarian 
assistance as well as defense for the Bosnian civilians.67 Reports from the Clinton 
																																																								
62 Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights,” 
International Affairs 69 no. 3 (1993), 102. 
63 Softic, The Legal Nature of the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Aggression, genocide, 
the UN response, nonrecognition, 172. 64	Chi-Hahn Chang, Ethical Foreign Policy? US Humanitarian Interventions, Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited (2011), 136. 
65 Chang, Ethical Foreign Policy, 124. 
66 “1993-02-19C, Anthony Lake to President Clinton re Presidential Decision on 
Humanitarian Air Drops for Bosnia,” Clinton Digital Library. 
67 1993-04-14, Ambassador Madeleine Albright to National Security Advisor re Options 
for Bosnia,” Clinton Digital Library. 	
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administration defined their intentions of sustaining democracy, claiming, “Escalating 
violence and its potential spillover into other Balkan states would undercut US interests 
in promoting democracy, economic reform, and regional cooperation.”68 These 
documents exposed the early intentions of the Clinton Administration in regards to the 
conflict in Bosnia. The Clinton Administration sought to retain the position of the US as a 
world super-power, as well as preserve democratic institutions and alliances within 
Europe. Differing objectives aligned in the campaign for the use of force to end the 
conflict.  
Other international bodies published reports of their own on the crimes committed 
in the former Yugoslavia. The European Community initially sought to resolve the issue 
in Yugoslavia in 1991, but as the conflict escalated and reports of “ethnic cleansing” rose, 
the EC sent an investigative mission into Bosnia and reported their findings in 1993.69 
The EC report stated that there were several thousand victims of rape, and that Serbian 
soldiers forcibly impregnated and detained women until the pregnancy could not be 
terminated.70 It openly denounced these acts as war crimes and called on fellow European 
nations to act against the perpetrators. The EC, being a large political body of European 
nations, had the visibility to encourage action against Serbian forces. However, “the EC 
was an economic grouping without a mechanism for formulating or implementing foreign 
																																																								
68  “1992-04-01, NIE Report, A Broadening Balkan Crisis Can It Be Managed,” Clinton 
Digital Library. 
69 Sakib Softic, The Legal Nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Aggression, 
Genocide, the UN Response, Nonrecognition. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic 
Publishing (1999), 236. 
70. European Community, “Report on Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina” EC Investigative 
Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslavia, Copenhagen, 
28 January 1993.  
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policy.”71 Despite its inability to bring real political change, it was still possible for the 
EC to be used as a platform to condemn these atrocities. Furthermore, the EC submitted 
their reports to the UN as evidence of the “ethnic cleansing” and sexual violence. The 
involvement of the EC reflected the concern of European nations to the conflict as well as 
their aversion to involvement.  
Despite international attention and criticism, the UN constructed a limited 
response. UN efforts in Bosnia involved peacekeeping efforts, instead of military action 
to end the conflict. The UN presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina began with Security 
Council Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992. This resolution mandated that 
UNPROFOR deploy peacekeepers to the region.72 Following this resolution, official UN 
involvement began on July 12, 1992.73 The UN deployed peacekeepers, but these 
peacekeepers had no jurisdiction to protect and enforce. “As Serb artillery shells crashed 
past the minarets into the center of this historic city [Travnik], British troops nearby 
winced as they described their orders, which are to do nothing beyond guarding convoys 
of humanitarian aid.”74 UNPROFOR was ordered to protect UNHCR in delivering 
humanitarian aid and protecting ‘safe areas.’75 The UN limited its role in the conflict to 
providing humanitarian relief and protection for those fleeing war zones.  
																																																								
71 Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, XXV.  
72 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 743 (1992) [Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia], 21 February 1992, S/RES/743 (1992); Cushman and Mestrovic, 
This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia   
73 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 764 (1992) [Bosnia and 
Herzegovina], 13 July 1992, S/RES/764 (1992). 
74 Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, 126.	75	Cutts, “The Humanitarian operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: dilemmas of negotiating 
humanitarian access,” 2. 
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The UN conducted its own fact-finding missions after appointing a special 
rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights 
violations in the former Yugoslavia.76 On August 14, 1992 the Commission on Human 
Rights appointed Special Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki to investigate the situation in 
Bosnia after adopting resolution 1992/S-1/1.77 Mazowiecki conducted three missions into 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, reporting to the UN Security Council after each mission. The 
first was conducted from the 21st of August to the-26th of  August 1992, the second from 
the12th of October to the- 22nd of  October 1992. After the third from January 12th to the 
23rd of 1993, Mazowiecki requested that a team of medical experts investigate and report 
on these allegations of mass rape and forced impregnation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.78 
In a report to the Security Council, the special rapporteur included the findings from this 
mission as well as documentation received from governments, intergovernmental 
agencies, and other missions conducted by UN bodies regarding rape.79 It concluded that 
rape was committed on a large scale by Serbian soldiers towards Muslim women. It also 
stated that no attempts were made by Serbian leaders to stop or punish rape, and that rape 
was used as a tool of “ethnic cleansing.”80 The findings of this mission and the statements 
from the Mazowiecki revealed the dire need for UN intervention on a greater scale.  The 																																																								
76 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 780 (1992) [Former Yugoslavia], 6 
October 1992, S/RES/780 (1992). 
77 UN Commission on Human Rights, resolution 1992/S-1/1, 14 August 1992. 
78 UN Secretary General. UN Commission on Human Rights. The Situation of human 
rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary General. Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia A/48/92 1993-02-26.  79	United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation of human rights in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary-General, A/48/92 S/25341 (26 February 
1993). 
80 United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary-General, A/48/92 S/25341 (26 February 1993). 
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Commission on Human Rights additionally called for international bodies to submit their 
findings to the UN Security Council in preparation for the establishment of a criminal 
tribunal. This report also noted the similarity and lack of coordination among missions 
conducted by the European Community, World Council of Churches, Amnesty 
International, and Helsinki Watch.81 Multiple organizations reporting on the issue 
brought attention to the situation, as well as the need for evidence of such reports. 
Additionally, this report criticized the media for re-victimizing and exploiting women 
with repeated interviews before these women were given the proper psychological or 
social support. 82  
The amassing of information on the atrocities committed in Bosnia led the UN to 
establish the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of the International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Since 1991.83 By establishing this criminal tribunal, the UN 
promoted its stance on human rights violations and their intentions to punish the 
criminals behind it. Instead of acting to prevent the “ethnic cleansing,” the UN instead 
reacted to the consequences of this genocide by establishing an international criminal 
tribunal to convict the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations 
of the laws or customs of war. The use of documented reports of human rights violations 
became a vital tool in the development of the UN’s response to the genocide in Bosnia. 
The amassing of reports by humanitarian organizations on the human rights violations 																																																								
81 United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary-General, A/48/92 S/25341 (26 February 1993). 
82 United Nations, General Assembly, The Situation of human rights in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia: Note by the Secretary-General, A/48/92 S/25341 (26 February 1993). 
83 United Nations General Assembly, Rape and abuses of women in the areas of armed 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,  A/Res/48/143. 20 December 1993. 
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would be useful for the documentation of violations by the ICTY. 84 The United Nations 
requested these documented investigations be submitted to the Security Council as 
evidence of war crimes that would allow the ICTY to begin prosecutions.  
UN Resolution 808 initiated the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in February of 1993. The ICTY was established to bring justice to 
those who violated international humanitarian law.85 Article 29 of the UN Charter 
allowed the UN to exercise its power to establish the ICTY.86 The Statute of the ICTY 
was drafted and approved with UN Resolution 827 on May 25, 1993.87 UN Resolution 
827 affirmed the Statute of the ICTY to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 and violations of laws and customs of war.88 Three judges made up 
the tribunal panel and a prosecutor responsible for investigating and indicting criminals.89 
The inception of an international tribunal arose from the public outcry over the published 
reports of mass atrocities occurring in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The ICTY was 
established to bring peace to the region and justice against the perpetrators of war crimes. 
The conflict, however, did not end until the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 
December 1995.90 The ICTY was created in the midst of the conflict as a strategy for 
																																																								
84 Young, “UNHCR and ICRC in the Former Yugoslavia,” 786. 
85 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 808 (1993) International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)], 22 February 1993, S/RES/808 (1993). 
86 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XV, Article 
29.  
87 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 827 (1993) [International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)], 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993). 
88 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 827 (1993) [International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)], 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 (1993). 
89 United Nations Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 25 May1993, supra note 12, art. 18. 
90 Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. 
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peace and as a way to temper public outrage over the inaction of international bodies in 
during the war.  
The establishment of an international criminal tribunal was meant to pressure the 
conflicting parties into peace, as well as put individual responsibility on the perpetrators 
of war crimes. UN Resolution 771 intended to publicize the information gathered by 
international bodies for the international community in order to bring awareness about 
those accountable for the war crimes.91 The resolution had a two-part purpose, as an 
attempt to halt the “ethnic cleansing” and to gather evidence on violations of international 
humanitarian law. The inception of the ICTY arose from the international demand for 
action and from the minimal action taken to end the conflict previously. UN Resolution 
780 established the UN Commission of Experts to collect evidence on war crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia.92 The commission published multiple reports on the 
humanitarian crisis. The first interim report published in February of 1993 argued that an 
international criminal tribunal would be necessary.93 Reports from the Commission of 
Experts stated that countless breaches of the Geneva Convention occurred in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and that systematic rape was part of the policy of “ethnic cleansing” being 
perpetuated by Serbian soldiers.94 Activities of this commission included the exhumation 
																																																								
91 James C Obrien, “The International Tribunal for violations of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia,” American Journal of International Law Vol. 
87 (1993), 641. 
92 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 780 (1992) [Former Yugoslavia], 6 
October 1992, S/RES/780 (1992).  
93 Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/25274; Lillian Barria and Steven Roper, “How 
effective are international criminal tribunals? An analysis of the ICTY and ICTR” 
International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 9 no 3 (2005), 354. 
94 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 24 May 1994 From the Secretary General to the 
President of the Security Council, 27 May 1994, S/1994/674.	
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of mass graves, investigating witness reports of mass rape and “ethnic cleansing.”95 
Based on evidence found through their fact-finding missions and documents submitted to 
the UN by additional investigative reports, the UN Security Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  
In preparation for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, the 
United Nations called upon other political bodies to submit their findings to the Security 
Council. The EC submitted their report, “EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of 
Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslavia,” which was especially influential on the 
decision to establish an international criminal tribunal, as indicated in UN Resolution 
808. 9697 Stating that mass rape was used as a tool to force populations of Bosnian 
Muslims to flee, in addition to other forms of humiliation and torture, the mission 
emphasized the role of rape as part of “ethnic cleansing.” “Rape is part of the pattern of 
abuse, usually perpetrated with the conscious intention of demoralizing and terrorizing a 
community.”98 This report made the clear distinction between rape as a byproduct of war 
and rape as a tool of war. The research conducted by the EC added substantial evidence 
for the accusation of war crimes. This report, written by the EC and submitted to the UN 
Security Council, provided evidence and reason to establish an international criminal 
tribunal.  
																																																								
95 Barria and Roper, “How Effective are international criminal Tribunals?” 355. 
96 European Community, “EC Investigative Mission into the treatment of Muslim women 
in the Former Yugoslavia. “Report on Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Copenhagen, 28 
January 1993. 
97 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 808 (1993) [International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)], 22 February 1993, S/RES/808 (1993) 
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 The US had a major role in the establishment of the ICTY. The US strongly 
supported the decision to establish a criminal tribunal and ensured its formation.99 The 
United States government commended the establishment of the ICTY, with Albright 
making evident US support in her statement regarding Resolution 808. “The Nuremberg 
principles have been reaffirmed. The lesson that we are all accountable to international 
law may finally have taken hold in our collective memory.”100 As the leading state in the 
UN, US support for the establishment of an international criminal tribunal was 
paramount. Without this unwavering backing, the formation of the ICTY would have 
been unlikely. The US further supported the tribunal by being the largest financial 
contributor to the ICTY.101 The tribunal employed a significant number of US citizens, 
and those employed were in high-level positions. This presented an opportunity for the 
US to influence tribunal proceedings.102 By playing a large role in the establishment of 
the ICTY as well as in its continuation and procedures, the US displayed its support for 
and influence on the ICTY.  
 It can be argued that the ICTY was established to remove pressure from the 
international community to become militarily involved in the conflict. “The tribunal 
appears to be more of a token to placate a disillusioned world than a symbol of the United 
																																																								
99 John Cerone, “U.S Attitudes toward international criminal courts and tribunals,” in The 
Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals, edited 
by Cesare P. Romano, Cambridge University Press (2009), 143. 
100 Madeleine K. Albright, UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 808 on War Crimes 
Tribunal, U.S Dept. of St. Dispatch No. 12 Art. 5 (March 22, 1993); Cerone, “U.S 
Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,” 145. 
101 Cerone, “U.S Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,”145. 
102 Cerone, “U.S Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,” 146. 
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Nations’ commitment to justice.”103 Public outcry against the genocide applied pressure 
to the international community to involve itself in the conflict. The failures of UN 
sanctions and arms embargos proved that military involvement would be necessary, and 
international community demanded action against the crimes of genocide. However, no 
nation was eager to act with force. The establishment of an international criminal tribunal 
was in response to these demands.104 The creation of the ICTY was a strategy to avoid 
military intervention, but this strategy failed as the war and “ethnic cleansing” continued 
uninhibited. The end to this conflict was far on the horizon, and worse war crimes were 
yet to come.  
The massive scale and magnitude of rape and sexual violence in Bosnia required 
the ICTY to thoroughly address these accusations and prosecute accordingly. However, 
no international statute for the prosecution of sexual violence had been developed. The 
ICTY reacted to the reported mass rape and forced pregnancy by instituting witness 
protection and gender sensitive policies. The unique use of rape by Bosnian Serbs as part 
of an official policy of war required the ICTY to develop specific gender sensitive 
procedures to ensure that the rights and privacies of the victims and witnesses were 
preserved.105 Due to international media attention and the activism of women’s groups, 
the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence crossed a threshold into gender policies.  The 
UN made evident its intent to prosecute the perpetrators of mass rape with a resolution in 																																																								
103 Cushman and Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in 
Bosnia, 286.  
104 Lilian Barria and Steven Roper, “How effective are international criminal tribunals? 
An analysis of the ICTY and ICTR” International Journal of Human Rights Vol. 9 no 3 
(2005), 355.	105	Anne M. Hoefgen, “There Will be no Justice Unless Women are Part of That Justice: 
Rape in Bosnia, the ICTY and Gender Sensitive Prosecution,” 14 Wisconsin Women’s 
Law Journal 155 (1999), 168. 
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February 1993 that defined rape as a war crime.106 This initial step defined the 
development of international law in regards to women’s rights as the ICTY yielded 
convictions of sexual violence as breaches of the Geneva Convention or the ICTY statute 
as war crimes or as crimes against humanity.107 The ICTY established procedures for the 
prosecution of cases of sexual violence where no such precedent had existed. 
The particular attention on gender policies of the ICTY was credited to the action 
of women’s advocacy groups, both international and local. Through various methods, 
women’s groups campaigned for gender specific policies to be put into practice by the 
ICTY. Such methods included letter writing campaigns, media work, protests, and 
conferences.108 This brought international attention to crimes of sexual violence as well 
as the obligation of the ICTY to prosecute them. The conversation on women’s rights 
gained international recognition during the Bosnian genocide due to the burgeoning 
women’s movement.109 Women’s advocacy groups had a variety of approaches; initially, 
these groups focused on bringing international attention to the prevalence of crimes of 
sexual violence in Bosnia. As women’s advocacy groups developed further, they 
crusaded for the prosecution of perpetrators of sexual violence in addition to the 
establishment of gender specific policies by the ICTY. The Association of Women 
Victims of War, for example, provided support and aid for rape victims in Bosnia. This 
organization mobilized victims and provided testimony for trials against sexual violence 
																																																								
106 UN Commission on Human Rights, Rape and abuse of women in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia., 23 February 1993, E/CN.4/RES/1993/8.  
107 Karen Engle, “Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,” The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 4 (2005), 781 108	Heidi Haddad, “Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and 
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in the ICTY.110 They provided a platform for the victims of sexual violence to speak out 
against the perpetrators of sexual violence. International women’s advocacy groups were 
responsible for the ICTY explicitly defining rape as a war crime and a violation of human 
rights.111 Through the campaigns of these advocacy groups, gender procedures were 
implemented in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These policies provided for 
greater precision in the prosecution of war criminals.  
UN Resolution 808, which established the ICTY, prompted feminist scholars and 
lawyers to formulate international gender policy for the consideration of the ICTY, 
campaigning vigorously for the ICTY to implement gender sensitive procedures. After 
Resolution 808, the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic of the City University 
of New York (CUNY) Law School formulated the memorandum, Gender Justice and the 
Constitution of the War Crimes Tribunal Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808.112 
This memorandum was the initial step made by feminist scholars and lawyers for gender 
sensitive policies in the ICTY. In 1993, it was distributed amongst women’s groups as 
well as submitted to the Secretary General of the UN, the UN Commission of Experts, 
the UN Security Council, and the UN office of Legal Counsel.  
This memorandum insisted that rape, forced prostitution, and forced pregnancy 
not only constituted crimes against humanity, but also grave breaches, regardless of the 																																																								
110 Diane Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in 
Bosnia. Open Society Justice Initiative (2010), 72. 
111 Denise Aydelott, “Mass Rape During War: Prosecuting Bosnian Rapists under 
International Law,” Emory International Law Review Vol. 7 No. 2 (1993).	112	International Women's Human Rights Clinic of CUNY Law School, Gender Justice 
and the Constitution of the War Crimes Tribunal Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
808, App. B to Jennifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for Prosecution of Rape and 
Other Gender-Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 171, 235 
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association with “ethnic cleansing.”113 This memorandum wanted the ICTY to address 
rape and forced pregnancy as both a genocidal and a gendered attack. This was to ensure 
that all forms of gender violence were prosecuted in the ICTY, not just crimes 
associated with the “ethnic cleansing.” Additionally, these crimes were to be tried as 
grave breaches and crimes against humanity, instead of solely the latter. The 
memorandum condemned the crime of forced impregnation as especially egregious, and 
insisted on the investigation and separation of this crime from rape or other sexual 
violence.114 In regards to the functioning of the ICTY, this memorandum advocated for 
women to be fully incorporated into every function of the ICTY. “The nature of the 
Tribunal’s function, the prevalence of gender-specific violations in this war, and the 
pervasiveness and subtlety of the gender-specific issues presented adds urgency to the 
implementation of gender parity.”115  Furthermore, feminist scholars proposed that 
gender sensitivity training be mandated in the judicial and prosecutorial staff of the 
ICTY as well as the establishment of a sex crimes unit to provide support to the victims 
of sexual violence who chose to testify.116 Mitigating any trauma that these victims 
would encounter was imperative to proper gender protocol, as well as to ensure that 
victims felt safe and secure to testify against their perpetrators. Particularly because of 
the trauma these victims incurred, the memorandum suggested these protections. 
Additionally, the memorandum insisted that the ICTY prosecute both those directly 
responsible and those through command.117 This was especially important to the ICTY’s 
																																																								
113 Ibid, 236. 114 Ibid., 237. 
115 Ibid., 238. 
116 Ibid., 238. 
117 Ibid., 240.	
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prosecution of sexual violence that was mandated from Serbian military command. 
Those who ordered as well as those who condoned sexual violence would be prosecuted. 
This addressed the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes of sexual violence. 
This demand would ensure that sexual violence be prosecuted, whether as a genocidal 
crime or as a gendered attack. This memorandum had substantial influence on the 
development of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY. However, not all 
their concerns were met under the initial institution of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  
The proposal, Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and other Gender 
Based Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A 
Feminist Proposal and Critique, was prepared by the International Women’s Human 
Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law and the 
Harvard Law School Human Rights Program.118 It was submitted to the ICTY judges at 
their first session in November of 1993, then refined and again sent to the judges at their 
second session in 1994. The refinements included critique of the initial “Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence” and their suggested modifications, including definite and 
mandated protections for the victims and witnesses, the inclusion of women within the 
Judicial branch of the ICTY, and gender sensitive training for all staff within the 
ICTY.119 Its purpose regarded gender violence in the ICTY as well as at the international 
level, “we recognized that the Tribunal rules would serve a model for future international 
																																																								118	Jennifer Green, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter, and Beth Stephens, Affecting the 
Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and other Gender-Based Violence Before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and 
Critique, 5 Hastings Women’s L.R 171 (1994), 177. 
119 Ibid., 178. 
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and national prosecutions of sexual crimes against women and provide international 
standards for national law reform regarding the prosecution of sex crimes in civil 
society.”120 Feminist scholars addressed the bigger picture of international gender policy 
within their recommendations for the ICTY. The main focus of this proposal was the 
establishment of gender sensitive procedures. 
The rules established for the investigation, trial, and protection of 
witnesses, and the understanding by all judges of the need for those rules, 
will determine whether war crimes of sexual violence will be fairly 
redressed with due regard for both rights of the accused and the protection 
of the victims. These rules will thus be a very significant factor in whether 
women ultimately come forward as complainants.121 
 
In addition to providing commentary and proposals to the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, this proposal sought greater implementation of female staff in the ICTY. This 
arose from the ICTY electing two female judges, which prompted a concern from 
feminist human rights scholars that women would play a minimal role in the judiciary 
and prosecutorial branch of the ICTY.122 Lastly, the proposal focused on protections for 
the victims and witnesses testifying. This included identity concealment and the proper 
admittance of evidence that ensured that the rights of the victims were maintained. 
The suggestions from these proposals were implemented within the ICTY Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. This included Rule 34: The Victims and Witnesses Unit. 
Rule 34 established that counseling and support would be provided for victims and 
witnesses of sexual violence, as well as the incorporation of female staff.123 Suggestions 
from these proposals were also implemented in Rule 69: Protection of Victims and 
																																																								
120 Ibid., 178. 
121 Ibid, 185. 
122 Ibid, 179. 
123 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 34, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March 14 1994). 
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Witnesses, which allowed the non-disclosure of the identity of victims and witnesses.124 
This provided safety and protection for the victims, establishing a safe environment for 
women to come forward to testify. Rule 75 provided further protections to witnesses and 
victims, including the non-disclosure of witnesses to the media or public, testimony 
through image altering or voice altering devices, the use of pseudonyms, and closed 
sessions.125 Rule 96 dealt entirely with sexual violence. It established that no 
corroboration of victim testimony would be required: consent would not be allowed as a 
defense, that evidence must be proven credible and relevant, and the prior sexual history 
of the victim could not be admitted.126 The establishment of Rule 96 is primarily due to 
these proposals from feminist scholars and lawyers. The advocacy of feminist scholars 
was paramount to the development of gender procedure in the ICTY as well as future 
international tribunals.  
Although their suggestions were widely implemented, feminist scholars still had 
concerns over the ultimate effectiveness of the policies the ICTY put in place. The main 
concern was with the lack of funding and staff for the Victims and Witnesses Unit. 
Further, the Victims and Witnesses Unit did not provide legal advice or representation,127 
which was especially problematic to feminist scholars. They argued that legal counsel 
separate from the Office of the Prosecutor would provide victims with the proper 
guidance and support necessary.128 Further concerns regarded women’s involvement in 
																																																								
124 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 69, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March 14 1994).	125	ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 75, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March 14 1994). 
126 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 96, U.N Doc IT/32 (March 14 1994). 
127 Green, Copelon, Cotter, and Stephens, Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape 
and other Gender-Based violence before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 220. 
128Ibid, 220. 
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the Judicial and Prosecutorial branch of the ICTY. The presence of female prosecutors 
and judges was paramount to feminist scholars. Despite this being among their initial 
critique and proposal to the ICTY, women were not involved at the scale these feminist 
scholars had hoped for.  
Article 22 of the Statute for the ICTY, adopted May 1993, defined the 
requirement for the ICTY to institute witness protection procedures.129 The ICTY 
implemented Article 22 by the creation of the Victims and Witnesses Unit in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.130 The Victims and Witnesses Unit provided counseling and 
support in cases of sexual violence. Additionally, this unit ensured the employment of 
women to the ICTY.131 By enacting this rule, the ICTY indicated a focus on the health 
and safety of the victims of sexual violence. The emphasis on the employment of women 
by the ICTY was noteworthy. This specific rule revealed the appreciation the ICTY had 
on the Bosnian genocide’s impact of women. While many people were victims, women 
were specifically targeted in the genocidal campaigns of the Serbian army. This targeted 
attack on women was addressed with the establishment of the Victims and Witnesses 
Unit to provide counseling for the victims, as well as the large presence of women 
employed in the ICTY. 
Further protections for victims and witnesses were enacted through Rule 75, 
which provided women privacy during court proceedings.132 Rule 75 allowed for the 
anonymity of those testifying. For instance, the identity of a victim or witness would be 
																																																								
129 ICTY, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 22, 
U.N Doc. S/Res/827 (1993). 
130 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 34, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March, 14 1994).  
131 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 34, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March, 14 1994). 
132 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 75, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March 14, 1994). 
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concealed during testimony through the use of image or voice altering devices, closed 
circuit television, assignments of pseudonyms, and closed sessions.133 All these 
protections were put in place to create a comfortable and safe environment for the victims 
of sexual violence, as fear of retribution or public opinion strongly influenced many of 
these victims. To eliminate any fear of testifying, the ICTY promulgated this rule. By 
providing a comfortable environment for victims and witnesses to testify, women were 
encouraged to come forward, ensuring the proper prosecution and conviction of the 
perpetrators of sexual violence.  
 Rule 96 regarded the admittance of evidence. It specifically directed that no 
corroboration of testimony was required, that consent was not a defense, and that the 
prior sexual history of the victim could not be admitted as evidence.134 The ICTY was 
aware that the prosecution of cases of sexual violence would be difficult, as the only type 
of evidence usually available was the testimony of the victims and other witnesses. These 
types of cases were unique in this aspect. Through establishing witness protections, the 
ICTY provided support and privacy for the victims and witnesses of sexual assault. By 
preventing the argument of consent from being used, the ICTY acknowledged the 
severity, scale, and the variety of forms that sexual violence had taken.  
The procedures developed to protect the victims and witnesses of sexual violence 
addressed gender rights in an international setting. These procedures brought visibility to 
the victims of sexual violence and to the necessity to prosecute sexual violence.135 The 
ICTY established that sexual violence was a crime that would no longer be overlooked, 
																																																								
133 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 75, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March 14, 1994).	
134 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 96, U.N Doc. IT/32 (March 14, 1994). 
135Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished, 44.  
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and that it would be prosecuted as a war crime, a crime against humanity, and as an 
instrument of genocide.136 By focusing on procedures for the prosecution of cases 
regarding sexual violence, the ICTY addressed women within the international 
community and through their requirements for gender-specific legislation and 
procedures,.137 An evolution of international criminal policy developed through the 
formation of rules and procedures specifically concerning the victims of sexual assault.  
The first international trial since Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as the first to 
address and prosecute sexual violence, was Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić. Tadić was 
initially indicted in February of 1995 and his trial began in May of 1996.138 The ICTY 
found Tadić guilty of crimes against humanity and in violation of laws and customs of 
war. The Appeals Chamber convicted Tadić of grave breaches, crimes against humanity, 
and violations of the laws or customs of war.139 Tadić had been the president of the 
Bosnian Serb Democratic Party and participated in the takeover and “ethnic cleansing” of 
Prijedor and Kozarac, in addition to the confinement of Muslim civilians at the Omarska 
camp. His trial pertained to acts of sexual violence committed towards male victims at 
the Omarska prison camp, in which Tadić was both a witness and perpetrator.140 While 
this case was important in that it was the first to explicitly address crimes of sexual 
violence in an international criminal tribunal, the issue had not yet been addressed for 
female victims of sexual violence during the armed conflict in Bosnia. However, as the 
first trial of the ICTY, the charges of sexual violence set the precedent for the ICTY to 																																																								
136 Ibid., 44. 
137 Hoefgen, “There Will Be No Justice Unless Women are Part of That Justice,”167. 
138 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1, Initial Indictment, 13 February 1995.  
139 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997; 
Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Judgment, 15 July 1999.  
140 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-T Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997. 
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prosecute sexual violence. Tadić was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and released on 
July 17, 2008.141  
 The Čelebići case involved the conviction of three men for war crimes including 
rape and torture in the Čelebići prison camp in Bosnia. The Čelebići case determined the 
responsibility that commanders have in the crimes committed by subordinates.142 Hazim 
Delić, the deputy commander of the camp, was convicted for crimes of sexual violence in 
the form of torture as a war crime. The judgment on Delić defined that the crime of rape 
can be torture, as 
Rape causes severe pain and suffering, both physical and 
psychological…Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage circumstances 
 in which rape, by or instigation of a public official, or with the consent 
 or acquiescence of an official, could be considered as occurring for  
a purpose that does not, in some way, involve punishment, coercion, 
discrimination or intimidation. In the view of this Trial Chamber  
this in inherent in situations of armed conflict. Accordingly,  
whenever rape and other forms of sexual violence meet the  
aforementioned criteria, then they shall constitute torture, 
 in the same manner as any other acts that meets these criteria.143  
This classification had not yet been defined in international humanitarian law, 
highlighting the importance of the Delić Judgment in forming the basis of rape as torture. 
This definition would be used frequently in later convictions of sexual violence in the 
ICTY. Zdravko Mucić, the commander of the Čelebići prison camp, was convicted for 
his superior responsibility of the grave breaches of international law that occurred under 
his supervision. His failure to prevent crimes of sexual violence, as well as his 
																																																								141	ICTY, Decision of the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of 
Sentence of Dusko Tadić IT-94-1-ES. 
142 Kelly D. Askin, “A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International 
Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003,” Human Rights Brief 11, no. 3 (2004), 17. 
143 Prosecutor vs. Mucic and 3 others, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, par 
495-496. 
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participation in them, resulted in multiple war crimes convictions.144 His conviction 
established precedent in which superior officers could be held fully responsible for 
crimes committed by subordinates under their authority. The charges of command 
responsibility paved the way for prosecution of those acting under explicit orders to rape, 
those aiding and abetting rape, as well as those with authority failing to prevent and 
punish those committing rape.145 This ensured that justice would be brought to all those 
involved. Mucić and Delić were convicted on November 16, 1998, a conviction that was 
upheld on appeal on February 20, 2001.146 Mucić was sentenced to nine years and was 
released on July 18, 2003.147 Delić was sentenced to 20 years and granted early release on 
June 24, 2008.148  It is important to note that those accused in the Čelebići case were 
Bosnian forces, committing crimes against Bosnian Serbs. The ICTY attempted to 
prosecute all those who committed war crimes, on both sides. Bosnian and Croat forces 
were prosecuted for perpetuating war crimes and sexual violence in Bosnia. All sides in 
this conflict perpetuated sexual violence, and it was the mission of the ICTY to prosecute 
all instances. As of September 2016, the 161 individuals that were prosecuted by the 
ICTY, 94 were Serbs. However, 29 individuals were Croatian and nine were Bosnian.149   
																																																								
144 Askin, “A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and 
Tribunals: 1993-2003,” 16. 
145 Julie Mertus, “When Adding Women Matters: Women’s Participation in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,” Seton Hall Law Review Vol. 
38 (2008), 1318.  
146 Prosecutor vs. Mucic and 3 others, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 16 November 1998, and 
Prosecutor vs. Mucic and 3 others, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 20 February 2001. 
147 ICTY IT-96-21-A, Order of the President in Response to Zdravko Mucic’s request for 
Early Release, 9 July 2008. 
148 ICTY, IT-96-21-ES, Decision on Hazim Delic’s Motion for Commutation of 
Sentence, Public Redacted, 24 June 2008.  
149 ICTY Official site: Key Figures, http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases. 	
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Prosecutor vs. Kunarec set a precedent for convictions regarding sexual violence.  
This case “was the first case on rape as a crime against humanity to come before the 
Yugoslav Tribunal, and the first international trial in history to adjudicate rape and 
enslavement for crimes essentially constituting sexual slavery.”150 The trial initiated the 
process of convicting men for crimes of sexual enslavement and torture as crimes against 
humanity. The basis for this conviction was the testimony of victims who were held 
against their will by Dragoljub Kunarec, Radomir Kovač, and Zoran Vuković in private 
homes for several months. During their confinement, Kunarec repeatedly raped his victims 
and was charged on 11 counts solely regarding the sexual violence he committed.151 The 
conviction of Kunarec for crimes of sexual violence exclusively was significant. The 
majority of convictions by the ICTY involved elements of sexual violence; however, they 
did not address crimes of sexual violence exclusively. The decision to establish rape as a 
crime against humanity was the result of the blatant discrimination against Muslims that 
Kunarec propagated during the armed conflict in Bosnia as well as his involvement with 
the rape camps in Foça. The discrimination and persecution of women because of their 
ethnicity, observed in the trial, aided in the ruling of rape as a crime against humanity. 
“They therefore fully embraced the ethnicity-based aggression of the Serbs against the 
Muslim civilians, and all their criminal actions were clearly part of and had effect of 
																																																								
150 Askin, “A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and 
Tribunals: 1993 to 2003,”19.  
151 Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements 
of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
the light of Security Council Resolution 1820. 
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perpetrating the attack against the Muslim civilian population.”152 Prosecutor vs. Kunarec 
established that crimes of sexual violence were serious and grave enough to prosecute 
unaccompanied. Kunarec was convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity on 
February 11, 2001, this conviction was upheld on appeal on June 12, 2002. He was 
sentenced to 28 years imprisonment.153 
 Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić was significant in finding that sexual violence 
could be used as evidence in prosecuting the crime of genocide. This case found that the 
systematic rape of women in Bosnia and forced impregnation provided evidence for 
“genocidal intent.”154 The ICTY made a distinction between independent cases of rape 
and the systematic rapes that occurred in Bosnia. This distinction allowed for the 
definition of systematic rape as a form of genocide.  
On the basis of the features of all these sexual assaults, it may be inferred 
that they were part of a widespread policy of ‘ethnic cleansing:’ the victims 
were mainly non-Serbian civilians, the vast majority being Muslims. Sexual 
assaults occurred in several regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a 
systematic fashion and using recurring methods... They were performed 
together with an effort to displace civilians and increase the shame and 
																																																								
152 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarec, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic, Judgment: IT-
96-T, 22 February 2001. 
153 Prosecutor vs. Kunarec and 2 others, Judgment, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-T, 22 
February 2001; Prosecutor vs Kunarec and 2 others, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 
Judgment, 12 June 2002. 
154 Susana SaCouto, “Advances and Missed Opportunities in the International 
Prosecution of Gender-Based Crimes,” 15.1 Michigan State Journal of International Law 
(2007), 144. See also Prosecutor vs. Karadzic and Mladic, IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, 
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedures of Evidence, 
16 July 1999, par 94. 
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humiliation of the victims and of the community they belonged to in order to 
force them to leave. 155 
The connection drawn between the crimes of sexual violence and “ethnic cleansing” 
established the genocidal intent of Serbian troops against the Bosnian population. The 
ICTY defined that sexual violence was connected to the “ethnic cleansing,” contradicting 
the notion that crimes of sexual violence are independent and unrelated to genocidal 
intent. The ICTY established that perpetrators of sexual violence could be charged and 
convicted for genocide. The conviction of genocide was brought before Radislav Krstić, a 
commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, for his role in the Srebrenica massacre. Krstić was 
convicted on counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or 
customs of war, persecutions and murder. He was sentenced to 35 years in prison. The 
conviction for persecution as crimes against humanity and the rape of women at Potočari 
during the Srebrenica massacre was included.156  
The participation of women in the ICTY was challenged and reaffirmed in the 
Furundžija case. On appeal, Anto Furundžija attempted to discredit Judge Florence 
Mumba as biased because of her participation in the UN Commission on the Status of 
Women. Furundžija was convicted of violations of laws or customs of war, which 
included rape, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.157 The defense attempted to 
characterize Judge Mumba as having too much knowledge and influence on women’s 
issues. Despite these attempts, the Appeals Court upheld the convictions and countered 																																																								
155 Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review of the 
Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedures of Evidence, 11 July 1996, 
par 64. 
156 Prosecutor vs. Krstic, IT-93-33-T, Judgment, 02 August 2001. 
157 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 164, 169–70  (July 21, 
2001). 
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the claim of bias. The Appeals Court reminded the defense team that the tribunal was 
established to prosecute crimes committed against women, and having a judge with 
extensive knowledge on gender issues was intentional to accomplish this goal.158 The 
ICTY regarded the role of women as prosecutors and judges as imperative to this 
mission. The Furundžija case also structured a definition of rape that would be used by 
the ICTY, defining it as: 
(i) The sexual penetration, however slight:  
(a) Of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator 
or any other object used by the perpetrator; or  
(b) Of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;  
(ii) By coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person.159 
This definition of rape would be used thereafter in the ICTY.  Furundžija’s attempt to 
discredit Judge Mumba failed, and instead reaffirmed the importance of women within 
the ICTY.    
While the ICTY was commended for introducing revolutionary legislation against 
sexual violence in an international setting, criticisms of the ICTY were marked, 
particularly from the failure to accomplish the initial goal of the ICTY, which was to 
bring peace. The ICTY was established in 1993, with the intent to end the genocidal 
violence by holding the perpetrators accountable.160 It was believed that if the soldiers 
were aware that there would be consequences for their actions, in the form of a war 
crimes tribunal, this would reduce their criminal acts. However, this notion proved 
																																																								
158 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, para. 164, 169–70  (July 
21, 2001). 
159 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, para. 164, 169–70  (July 
21, 2001). 
160 Lillian Barria and Steven Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? 
An Analysis of the ICTY and ICTR,” 358.	
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incorrect as the conflict continued until late 1995.161 The violence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina did not cease until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 
of 1995.162 Nearly three years after the ICTY was mandated, a tentative peace was finally 
established. The failures of the ICTY to establish peace in the midst of conflict is evident 
in the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995.163 If a war crime tribunal did not have the 
authority itself to end the violence, greater measures were necessary.  
 The conflict in Bosnia ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords on 
December 14, 1995.164 The US was a proponent for NATO airstrikes early in 1995, 
however the UN and subsequent member nations disagreed with the use of military force 
because of the safety of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia. However, after the Srebrenica 
massacre in July 1995, the international community agreed that NATO airstrikes would 
be necessary to stop the increasing violence and genocide by Bosnian Serb forces. The 
US, a founding member of NATO, had a key interest in maintaining their credibility as a 
world power.165 In August of 1995, the two-week NATO airstrike campaign, Operation 
Deliberate Force, began. These bombings hindered the Serbian effort, forcing Serbian 
leaders to concede to peace discussions towards the end of 1995. Further efforts by 
Muslim and Croatian forces gained headway in regaining territory from Serbia, and the 
siege of Sarajevo was ended in September. By October, a nationwide cease-fire was 																																																								161	Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,” 358. 
162 Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. 
163 The Srebrenica Massacre occurred in July 1995. The Army of the Republic of Srpska 
murdered over 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys.  
164 Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. 
165 Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” Brookings 
(December 1998). 
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mandated and peace talks began in Dayton, Ohio.166 The Dayton Peace Accords were 
signed by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia and implemented in December 
1995 at the leadership of US official Richard Holbrook.167 The Dayton Accords split 
Bosnia and Herzegovina into two regions: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Republika Srpska. NATO deployed forces to assist and oversee the implementation of 
the Dayton Peace Accords.168 With peace now established, the UN would begin the 
process of prosecuting war crimes. Without the NATO involvement and airstrikes, an end 
to this conflict was unforeseeable. Despite reports of “ethnic cleansing” dating as early as 
1992, the international community refused to take military action until the crimes of 
Bosnian Serb forces could no longer be ignored. UN peacekeeping efforts had ultimately 
failed, as NATO military force was necessary to end the violence. The UN faced severe 
criticism for their failure to stop the violence and, now that the war had ended, the 
international community looked skeptically towards UN efforts to prosecute the massive 
instances of war crimes.  
The Srebrenica massacre was the biggest failure of UN peacekeeping efforts. 
Despite the initiation of the ICTY in 1993 and initial indictments released in 1994, 
mandated violence against the civilian population in Bosnia peaked in July 1995.169 Not 
only did the massacre reveal initial failures of the ICTY, but also UN peacekeeping 
measures as a whole. The Srebrenica massacre was “the single worst atrocity committed 
																																																								166	Chang, Ethical Foreign Policy? US Humanitarian Interventions., 112. 
167 Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended” and Chang Ethical 
Foreign Policy? US Humanitarian Interventions, 130. 
168 NATO, “15 Years ago, Dayton Peace Accords: a milestone for NATO and the 
Balkans,” 14 December 2010; Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. 
169 ICTY-IT-94-2-I Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Initial Indictment, 4 November 1994 
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in the former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s and the worst massacre that 
occurred in Europe since the months after World War II.”170 Srebrenica was declared a 
safe area in 1993 and a cease-fire established, protected by UNPROFOR.171 However, 
this proved short-lived as Bosnian Serb troops launched an attack on Srebrenica on July 
6, 1995 that led to the fall of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces on July 11, 1995.172 UN 
peacekeeping officials were reluctant to use force against Bosnian Serb forces, thereby 
allowing these forces to overtake Srebrenica with no interference.173 Upwards of 28,000 
refugees in Srebrenica fled to the UN base at Potočari, where Bosnian Serb forces began 
to transport civilians into Bosnian controlled territory. However, men aged 16 to 60 were 
separated and the systematic murder of approximately 8,000 men occurred between July 
11 and July 19.174 Women were victims of rape and sexual violence by Bosnian Serb 
forces in Potočari while waiting to be transported. Human Rights Watch, The New York 
Times, and The Independent published reports of rape and sexual abuse in the Srebrenica 
massacre.175 It was the biggest failure of UN peacekeeping measures in the Bosnian War. 
The ICTY indicted 19 individuals for the crimes committed in Srebrenica. Prosecutor v. 																																																								
170 ICTY, “Facts about Srebrenica,” Outreach, originally published in Justice in 
Transition Vol. 1 (October 2005), 1. 
171 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 819 (1993) [Bosnia and 
Herzegovina], 16 April 1993, S/RES/819 (1993). 
172 Ivan Lupis and Laura Pitter, “The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN 
Peacekeeping: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 17 No. 13 (October 
1995), 14. 
173 Lupis and Pitter, “The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN Peacekeeping: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,” 1. 
174ICTY, “Facts about Srebrenica,” Outreach, originally published in Justice in 
Transition Vol.1 (October 2005), 2. 
175 Ivan Lupis and Laura Pitter, “The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN 
Peacekeeping: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Human Rights Watch Vol. 17 No. 13 (October 
1995); Stephen Kinzer, “Conflict in the Balkans: The Refugees; Bosnian Refugees’ 
Accounts Appear to Verify Atrocities,” New York Times (July 17 1995); Snjezana Vukic, 
“Refugees Tell of Women Singled Out for Rape,” The Independent (July 18 1995). 
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Krstić found that genocide occurred in Srebrenica from July 11th to 19th, and General 
Radislav Krstić was found guilty for his role in this massacre.176 The massacre revealed 
the futility of UN established “safe areas” and discredited the notion that the mere 
establishment of an international criminal court would deter forces from committing 
further war crimes.  
The ICTY failed to bring peace in the aftermath of the conflict as both Bosnian 
and Serbian public sentiment regarded the ICTY with bitterness. Peace through 
reconciliation was not met, as the ICTY created animosity among the differing 
communities within Bosnia and Herzegovina.177 The Bosnian Muslim public reaction to 
the ICTY was, for the most part, in support of its institution, however particular elements 
in the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes in the ICTY spurned resentment among 
Bosnians. The largest complaint from Bosnian Muslims was that the sentences were too 
short. In one instance, a former camp guard received relatively light sentence of eight 
years for killing five inmates,178 and it was felt that the ICTY failed in achieving true, 
lasting justice for the victims and their families. Another criticism regarded the failure to 
hold all accountable. The ICTY convicted 161 people for violations of the international 
humanitarian law.179 This number appeared too low for the majority of the Bosnian 
Muslim population. Furthermore, massive public discontent was present in the ICTY's 
																																																								176Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case no. IT-99-33, Appeals Judgment, 19 April 2004. 
177 Donna Arzt, “Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal 
Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone,” The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 603 (2006), 232. 
178 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Predrag Banovic IT- 02-65/S-1, Judgment, 28 October 2003; 
Marlise Simon, “Plea Deals Being Used to Clear Balkan War Tribunal’s Docket,” New 
York Times (November 2003); Arzt, “Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of 
International Criminal Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone,” 232. 
179 ICTY Official Site “Key Figures” http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases. 	
46
Voces Novae, Vol. 9 [2018], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/vocesnovae/vol9/iss1/5
	 																																																																																																																																								Brashear
          
46 
allowance of plea bargains. The Bosnian Muslim population was shocked that plea 
bargains were put into practice in the ICTY, an option not present in their national court 
system.180 The expectations of the Bosnian Muslims had fallen flat when the convictions 
and practices of the ICTY were contrary to what they had hoped for.181 Negative 
sentiment towards the ICTY in Bosnia was a result of the poor communication between 
the tribunal and local institutions. Local expectations were not met because of the lack of 
communication.182 The ICTY failed to connect with local organizations and women’s 
groups. These organizations played a large role in interviewing and providing assistance 
to victims of sexual assault, however, their potential to aid the ICTY was ignored.183 
Establishing a relationship with local women’s organizations would have allowed the 
ICTY to successfully prosecute a larger proportion of sexual assault because these 
organizations worked directly with the victims.184 Efforts by the UN to alleviate the 
communication block came too late for a substantial impact.  
Serbia and the Republic of Srpska were largely against the ICTY. The vast 
majority of Serbians disapproved of the practices and convictions of the ICTY.185 Their 
criticism lay in their distrust of the ICTY, as well as their impression of false intent. 
Serbians felt that the ICTY specifically targeted Serbians, and was not an independent 
																																																								180	Arzt, “Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal 
Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone,” 235. 
181 Mirko Klarin, “The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former 
Yugoslavia,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 7 no.1 (2009).  
182 Julie Mertus, “When Adding Women Matters: Women’s Participation in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” Seton Hall Law Review Vol. 
38 Art. 4 (2008), 1323. 
183 Julie Mertus, “When Adding Women Matters,” 1322. 
184 Julie Mertus, “When Adding Women Matters,” 1326. 
185 Klarin, “The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia.” 
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body convicting all criminals in the Bosnian war.186 The distrust of the ICTY among 
Serbians was largely because of the bias they felt in the indicting and sentencing of war 
criminals. Because of the negative feelings towards the tribunal, Serbian cooperation was 
slight, which created additional problems for the ICTY.187  
International criticism of the ICTY regarded the problems of application, as 
opposed to the concept of the tribunal. The ICTY was established in 1993, however 
indictments did not initially go out until 1994. It took two years before the ICTY was 
able to apprehend any of the first 34 indictments.188 Initially, the ICTY faced non-
compliance in the international community to extradite the criminals.189 Further, critics 
argued that it was impractical to initiate a criminal tribunal in the midst of an armed 
conflict.190 The ICTY did not begin trials until 1996. Additional criticism of the ICTY 
was in respect to the shortsightedness of its creators.191 The tribunal was not allocated the 
proper funds for the effective prosecution of the war criminals. Furthermore, the ICTY 
did not begin with an adequate number of judges for the process to run smoothly and 
quickly.192 The ICTY originally tried one case at a time, drawing out the process 
indefinitely for those waiting trial, an ineffective method for an international tribunal 																																																								186	Arzt, “Views on the Ground: The Local Perception of International Criminal 
Tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone,” 233. 
187 Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,” 355. 
188 Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,” 356. 
189 Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,” 359. 
190 Payam Akhavan, “The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace 
Agreement and beyond,” Human Rights Quarterly 18 no. 2 (1996), 269. 
191 Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,”, 364. 
192 Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,” 360. 
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hoping to gain prominence and legitimacy among the international community.193 The 
ICTY further struggled with obtaining evidence, largely because the ICTY was 
established during an armed conflict. It was nearly impossible to gather evidence in 
locations where the conflict was the most severe. Additionally, the majority of evidence 
needed for prosecution was solely based on the testimony of the victims and witnesses.194  
Feminist critique of the ICTY focused on the ICTY’s interpretation of rape in the 
trials it prosecuted. In cases regarding sexual violence committed during the conflict, the 
focus remained on rape as a crime against the community, rather than a crime against the 
specific women. This led to a patriarchal understanding of rape within the context of the 
ICTY.195 Feminist criticism was on the treatment of victims of rape and sexual violence 
as witnesses to the crimes, instead of the victims.196 This treatment created a divide 
between the victim and the assault committed against them. The ICTY ignored the 
ongoing suffering these women faced from the aftermath rape due to the rules of 
relevancy. These victims were unable to share their ongoing struggles of their 
victimization and rape. This removed ownership from the victims, who did not feel that 
they had been brought justice.197  
																																																								
193 Dominic Raab, “Evaluating the ICTY and its Completion Strategy: Efforts to Achieve 
Accountability for War Crimes and their Tribunals,” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 3 no.1 (2005), 87. 
194 Barria and Roper, “How effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis 
of the ICTY and ICTR,” 358. 
195 Rosalind Dixon, “Rape as a crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to from 
here?” European Journal of International Law Volume 13 No. 3 (2002), 703. 
196 Dixon, “Rape as a crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to From Here,” 
705. 
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705. 
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 Feminist scholars continued to debate as to how the tribunal should prosecute rape in this 
specific circumstance. The debate was divided on the prosecution of rape as genocide. 
Scholar Catherine MacKinnon argued at the onset of the ICTY: 
Like all rape, genocidal rape is particular as well as part of the generic, 
and its particularity matters. This is ethnic rape as an official policy of war 
in a genocidal campaign for political control…It is specifically rape under 
orders. This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control. It is also 
rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make the victims 
wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced exile, rape to 
make you leave your home and never want to go back…It is rape to drive 
a wedge through a community, to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It 
is rape as genocide.198 
 
MacKinnon was the main proponent to prosecute rape as genocide in the ICTY, arguing 
that rape could occur simultaneously as an act of war and genocide. A separate camp of 
feminists largely critiqued this viewpoint, fearing that charging rape as genocide would 
make it difficult to establish other convictions on rape. Rhonda Chopelon led the 
opposition against charging rape as genocide. She argued that rape outside of the context 
of genocide would be ignored. Because rape was committed on such a large scale in this 
conflict, every instance of this crime should be prosecuted, not just instances of rape as 
genocide.199 Chopelon’s argument succeeded, as rape was charged in the ICTY as crimes 
against humanity, grave breaches, and violations of laws and customs of war.200 While 
genocidal intent was apparent, the ICTY did not bring charges of genocide in relation to 
																																																								
198 Catherine MacKinnon, “Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights,” 17 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 5, 16 (1994), 12. 
199 Mertus, “When Adding Women Matters: Women’s Participation in the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” 1317.  
200 Mertus, “When Adding Women Matters,” 1315.	
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sexual violence and forced impregnation.201 This was one of the largest critiques in 
feminist scholarship of the ICTY. For example, the Kunarec trial had many elements of 
genocidal intent, however no charges were brought.202 Testimonies from the victims in 
the Kunarec trial revealed the intent for Bosnian Muslim women to give birth to Serbian 
babies.203 This forced impregnation could have been charged as genocide. One of the few 
convictions of genocide in the ICTY was against Radislav Krstić for his role in the 
Srebrenica massacre.204 No genocide charges were brought forward for the crimes of 
forced impregnation. This crime has largely been ignored in the ICTY, despite its 
genocidal intent. While feminist scholars agreed that the ICTY was imperative to bring 
justice to Bosnia, and that it made progress in the jurisdiction of sexual violence, the 
ICTY failed to correctly and fully address the crimes of sexual violence in Bosnia for 
what they truly were: attacks on Bosnian women because they were women.   
To further analyze the successes and failures of the ICTY, the reflections of 
former ICTY Judge and President Gabrielle Kirk McDonald are essential. McDonald 
served as a judge for the ICTY in 1993 and as president from 1997 to 1999. Prior to her 
time with the tribunal, McDonald was an American civil rights lawyer who worked with 
																																																								201	Karen Engle, “Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” The American Journal of International Law 99 no. 4 (2005), 
783. 
202 Kelly Askin, “Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and 
Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status,” The American Journal of International Law 93, 
no.1 (1999), 114. 
203 Askin, “Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan 
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the NAACP and as a federal judge in Texas.205 The election of a female American civil 
rights lawyer as one of the original judges in the ICTY, and later president impacted the 
structure of the ICTY; particularly, how the ICTY addressed sexual violence in the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence. The previous absence of women in the roles of lawmakers 
and enforcers explained the lack of prosecution of sexual violence prior to the ICTY.206 
In 1993, with the establishment of the ICTY and the appointment of McDonald as a 
judge, witness and victim protections would be seriously considered and put in place, 
which allowed sexual violence to be sufficiently prosecuted.  
As one of the original 11 judges, McDonald participated in the formulation of the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Of the 11 judges, only two were women: McDonald 
and Elizabeth Odio Benito. They were the first women to be instituted into an 
international court as judges.207 McDonald took the lead in formulating Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, relying on US law to build the law’s framework.208 McDonald 
took special interest in the matters of sexual assault in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.209 She relied heavily on the proposal submitted to the ICTY by the 
International Women’s Human Rights Clinic at CUNY Law School. The suggestions 
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208 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, “The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project: An Interview 
with Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,” Interview by David Briand and Leigh Swigart, 
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made in this proposal pertained to rights of the victims of sexual violence, ensuring that 
the victim would not become the accused during the trial.210 McDonald’s particular 
interest in the sexual violence as well as her reliance on this proposal to create the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence instituted protections for victims of sexual violence that were 
never before used in an international court. As a leading voice among the judges, 
McDonald used US law as well as proposals from American women’s advocacy groups 
to devise the protections for victims and witnesses while still upholding the rights of the 
accused.211  
In McDonald’s reflections on the ICTY, she observed how uncomfortable men 
acted on the issue of sexual assault, stating “you know, I think as I sat through trials and 
consideration of the issue, there is a certain sense, a certain, I don’t want to say 
‘sensitivity,’ a certain ‘reaction’ that men have to this whole business of sexual 
assault.”212 As a woman in her position, McDonald ensured the inclusion of sexual 
assault in indictments as well, even confronting the prosecutor on the absence of sexual 
assault in several of the indictments.213 Her observation on the reactions to sexual assault 
reflected the importance of the implementing women in high positions in the ICTY.  
McDonald reflected on her time with the ICTY, particularly its effectiveness as a 
whole. Her main criticism of the ICTY regarded the lack of enforcement. While the 
Statute of the ICTY stated that compliance among nations is required, no system to 																																																								210	McDonald, “The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project: An Interview with Gabrielle 
Kirk McDonald,” 9. 
211 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Reflections on the Contribution of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (2000), 160. 
212 McDonald, “The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project: An Interview with Gabrielle 
Kirk McDonald,” 39. 
213 McDonald, “The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project: An Interview with Gabrielle 
Kirk McDonald,” 39. 
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enforce this was present.214 Non-compliance was widespread in the initial years of the 
ICTY, especially among the former Yugoslavian nations of Serbia, Republika Srpska, 
and Croatia in addition to other member nations of the UN.215 
By way of example, while over seventy people had been indicted by mid-
1997, only eight were in custody. States were reluctant to provide staff or 
funds, declined to order the 60,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia to assist what 
few investigations the prosecutor had, and it had been said, refused to 
provide it the intelligence information that would have allowed the 
investigation of those who instigated and directed the violence.216 
 
The lack of support for the ICTY made the initial years problematic for McDonald and 
the other judges. Antonio Cassese, the first president of the ICTY, reported non-
compliance five separate times to the Security Council.217 At the onset of McDonald’s 
presidency in 1997, cooperation had increased substantially due to international activist 
efforts. However, non-compliance once again became an issue after the conflict in 
Kosovo began. This resulted in McDonald reporting non-compliance to the Security 
Council six times within one year.218 Without enforcement capabilities there was little 
McDonald or others could do in regards to state non-compliance.  
During the two years that McDonald served as president, she expanded the ICTY 
and adopted measures to bring about expedited trials. Indictments that had been made 
years before were beginning to transition to trial. In response to the influx of cases at 
trial, McDonald requested three additional judges, as well as two additional courtrooms. 
																																																								
214 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, “Problems, Obstacles and Achievements of the ICTY,” 
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Additionally, she adapted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 1998 to include new 
rules for trial efficiency.219 Because of her expansion of the ICTY, it was possible to 
hold multiple trials simultaneously, which alleviated the backup of cases.  
McDonald observed the lack of interest in the ICTY in the US, but more importantly, 
the lack of awareness and understanding of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia.220 The 
misrepresentation of the ICTY was extensive in the former Yugoslavia, particularly 
because of the distance of The Hague from the actual site of the crimes.221 McDonald 
responded to the misconceptions of the ICTY by establishing the Outreach Programme 
in 1999. The Outreach Programme promoted the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia by 
providing information on the accomplishments and works of the ICTY.222 The efforts in 
the Outreach Programme also included bringing judges and lawyers from the former 
Yugoslavia to The Hague who “watched the trials, they could speak one-on-one to the 
judges, they spoke to the Victims and Witnesses Unit, the prosecutors, and the Registry, 
the whole thing. They got an understanding that we’re not sitting in The Hague with 
horns, trying to go after any group of people.”223 The Outreach Programme attempted to 
dispel misconceptions of the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia.  
McDonald’s reflections on the ICTY involved the difficulties she faced as a judge 
and president, yet she still concluded positively on the work of the ICTY. “The Tribunal 
has expanded the jurisprudence of international humanitarian law. Secondly, it has 
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demonstrated that the rule of law is an integral part of the peace process. Third, the 
tribunal has proved that international criminal justice is possible.”224 McDonald 
commended the ICTY for the procedure it established, which would be implemented by 
other international and national bodies. Additionally, McDonald acknowledged the 
awareness that the ICTY brought to the violations of human rights and the need to 
prosecute these violations.225 At the local level, the ICTY allowed for the possibility of 
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia by prosecuting the criminals, developing law to 
be established in local courts, and by allowing victims to put their suffering on record.226 
The UN sought to reflect the effectiveness of the ICTY on prosecuting sexual 
violence. Resolution 1820, adopted by the Security Council on June 19, 2008, analyzed 
the development of international gender justice and called for the Security Council to 
release a review on the ad hoc international criminal tribunals of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
and the Special court for Sierra Leone.227 This Resolution was part of the UN response to 
gender violence in the wake of the new century.  
Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected 
by armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use 
of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill 
fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or 
ethnic group.228 
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The international attention on the crimes of sexual violence in Bosnia led to the UN’s 
implementation of policies for the sole purpose of addressing and eliminating sexual 
violence. Documents such as Resolution 1820 were published by the UN Security 
Council in the wake of concentrated gender violence, not only in Bosnia, but in Rwanda 
and Sierra Leone as well.229 Its purpose of the resolution was to analyze the efficacy of 
international criminal tribunals in addressing and implementing proper procedures to 
successfully convict perpetrators of sexual violence.  
In response to Resolution 1820, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
published the Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the light of Security 
Council Resolution 1820 in March of 2009.230 This review provided an in-depth analysis 
of the cases from ICTY regarding convictions for sexual violence. A significant finding 
in this review addressed the nature of sexual violence in Bosnia: 
At the ICTY, a noticeable feature of relevant judgments is that sexual 
violence against civilians formed part of and flowed from the so-called 
‘ethnic cleansing’ of areas coveted by parties to the conflict. Sexual violence 
																																																								
229 Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements 
of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
the light of Security Council Resolution 1820, 9 March 2009, 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/sv_files/DPKO_report_sexual_violence.pdf. 
230 Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements 
of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
the light of Security Council Resolution 1820, 9 March 2009.	
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centering on detention centres, including in situations amounting to sexual 
slavery of women and girls, comprise a considerable part of the findings231 
Furthermore, the ICTY did not limit its judgments on sexual violence to instances of rape 
as a crime against humanity. Sexual violence in the form of torture, enslavement and 
persecution were tried as war crimes as well as a crime against humanity.232 The ICTY 
addressed the multiplicity of the types of sexual violence in the Bosnian genocide. This 
review outlined specific cases in which men were convicted for crimes of sexual violence 
as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. As of September 2016, 78 
individuals were indicted for crimes including sexual violence and 32 were convicted for 
crimes of sexual violence. 14 individuals were acquitted for charges of sexual violence, 
nine died before the end of their trial, and six cases were transferred to a national 
jurisdiction. Lastly, 11 cases involving charges of sexual violence were still in trial in as 
of September, 2016.233 When comparing these numbers to the estimated tens of 
thousands instances of rape, it is difficult to maintain the success of the ICTY in bringing 
justice to the victims of sexual violence. The ICTY set an international standard for 
prosecuting sexual violence. The efforts of this tribunal, despite the apparent low 
numbers, cannot be ignored. Without any prior jurisdiction, the ICTY managed to 
formulate extensive procedures to safeguard the rights of the victims and witnesses of 
																																																								
231 Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements 
of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
the light of Security Council Resolution 1820, 9 March 2009.  
232 Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements 
of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 
the light of Security Council Resolution 1820, 9 March 2009.  
233 ICTY Official Site, “Crimes of Sexual Violence: In Numbers”	http://www.icty.org/en/in-focus/crimes-sexual-violence/in-numbers.		
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sexual violence, enabling victims to come forward and testify against their perpetrators 
without fear of retaliation. Further, the ICTY expanded the way in which sexual violence 
was prosecuted under crimes against humanity, grave breaches, and genocide. The 
casework from the ICTY on sexual violence was imperative to the future of prosecuting 
sexual violence in the international tribunals to come.  
The ICTY initiated a precedent in prosecuting sexual violence, which would be 
carried on through subsequent international tribunals. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established in 1994, followed the example of the ICTY in 
convicting sexual violence. The ICTR also set its own precedent for prosecuting sexual 
violence. Unlike the ICTY, the ICTR was able to prosecute rape as genocide and 
establish a solid definition of rape. The Akaseyu case rendered the decision: 
The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual 
violence includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which 
is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. This act 
must be committed:  
(a) as part of a widespread or systematic attack; 
(b) on a civilian population 
(c) on certained catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, 
political, racial, or religious grounds. 234 
 
The Akaseyu case improved the definition of rape. The ICTR followed the model of the 
ICTY closely in prosecuting sexual violence, even improving on it. Further, the ICTR 
was able to charge rape as genocide. The Akaseyu case held that rape and sexual violence 
constituted genocide in the attack on Tutsi women.235 Akaseyu was found guilty of 
Genocide and Crimes against Humanity for extermination, murder, torture, rape, and 																																																								234	Prosecutor	v.	Akaseyu,	ICTR	96-4-T	(September,	1998)	Para	596.	
235 Prosecutor	v.	Akaseyu ICTR-96-4-T (September, 1998), Para 731. 
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inhuman acts on September 2, 1998.236 Decisions rendered in the ICTR revealed that the 
ICTY was effective in establishing a guideline for the prosecution of sexual violence. By 
improving on the definitions of sexual violence in the ICTY, the ICTR developed 
significant casework that would not have been possible without the influence of the 
ICTY.  
 The ICTY further influenced the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The Rome Statute was signed July 17, 1998, which established the ICC.237 ICTY 
standards for prosecuting sexual violence influenced the Rome Statute prohibiting rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization as 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in international and non-international armed 
conflicts.238 Jurisdiction from the ICTY as well as the campaigning of the Women’s 
Caucus ensured that sexual violence would no longer be ignored under international law. 
Sexual violence was no longer listed under “outrages upon personal dignity.”239 The 
Rome Statute utilized the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence in formulating gender 
policy as well. The ICC established that corroboration was not necessary and that consent 
and sexual history of the victim would not be admissible as evidence.240 The influence of 
the ICTY on the Rome Statute was evident. Further, the ICC built a more comprehensive 
																																																								
236 Prosecutor	v.	Akaseyu ICTR- 96-4-T (September, 1998) Verdict.  
237 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended 2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6. 
238 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended 2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6. 
239 Richard Goldstone and Estelle Debon, “Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes 
Under International Criminal Law,” New England Journal of Public Policy Vol. 19 
(2003), 134. 
240 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last 
amended 2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6. 
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framework for the prosecution of sexual violence.241 Through the precedents established 
in the ICTY, gender violence was no longer considered a by-product of war or an attack 
on one’s honor. The ICTY established that sexual violence would be prosecuted, how it 
would be prosecuted, and protections for those victims and witnesses of sexual 
violence.242 As the first international criminal tribunal to prosecute sexual violence in its 
totality, the ICTY was the groundwork for future tribunals.  
Although sexual violence has always been an element of war, it was largely 
ignored, and treated as though it were impossible to avoid. It was not until the ICTY that 
sexual violence was realized for what it was, a violent attack on women that should be 
prosecuted under international humanitarian law. The reports from humanitarian 
organizations, the media, and political organizations during the Bosnian conflict 
influenced this new understanding. Furthermore, the larger women’s movement and 
newfound feminist advocacy prompted the UN to fully address the issue of gender 
violence in war.   Sexual violence was now considered severe enough to prosecute 
through the action of Western media and aid during the Bosnian conflict. To address the 
criticism of Western media and aid, the UN established the ICTY, which defined its 
stance on women’s rights violations and their intention to punish the criminals behind it. 
The ICTY formulated the procedures for later tribunals to follow in prosecuting sexual 
violence.   
																																																								
241 Goldstone and Debon, “Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes Under 
International Criminal Law,” 136. 
242 Goldstone and Debon, “Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes Under 
International Criminal Law,” 123. 
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